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Sometimes a government or other payer is called on to fund a new health technology even 
when the evidence leaves a lot of uncertainty.  One way to manage this problem is for the 
payer to provisionally fund the technology and reduce uncertainty by developing evidence.  
This is referred to as coverage with evidence development (CED).  When the payer funds the 
technology only for patients who participate in the evidence development, the coverage is 
known as only-in-research.  This type of CED raises the sharpest questions of coercion and 
inducement.  Is the patient coerced or induced into participating in the evidence 
development?  If so, under what circumstances, if any, is this ethically justified?  Building on 
work by Miller and Pearson, we argue that patients have a right to funding for a technology 
only when the payer can be confident that the technology provides reasonable value for 
money.  This means that patients have no right to technologies under a CED arrangement, 
since technologies are candidates for CED precisely because serious questions remain about 
value for money.  It is for this reason that CED induces rather than coerces.  The separate 
question of whether the inducement is ethically justified remains.  We argue that CED does 
pose risks to patients, and the worse these risks are, the more difficult it is to justify the 
inducement.  Finally, we propose conditions under which the inducement could be ethically 
justified, as well as means of avoiding inducement altogether.  All of this has major bearings 
on the types of CED that are ethically justified and the governance structures that need to be 
in place.  To develop our argument, we draw on the Australian context, so our conclusions 
apply most directly to comparable contexts, where the payer is a government that provides 








CED is the policy instrument most commonly used to reduce decision uncertainty at the point 
of funding a new health technology.  Several ethical analyses have questioned whether CED 
inherently coerces or induces patients to participate in evidence development.  Miller and 
Pearson have argued that patients are induced but not coerced, since patients are enticed by 
possible health benefits but there is no threat of harm for not participating and patients are not 
entitled to unproven technologies. 
 
But CED technologies are partially proven.  And whether foregone treatment results merely 
in foregone benefits or, more worryingly, in harms depends on whether anyone has a duty to 
provide the treatment.  No payer has a duty to fund a CED technology because its value for 
money is precisely in question.  So CED involves inducement, not coercion, but for reasons 
different from those advanced by Miller and Pearson. 
 
CED does pose risks to patients, and the worse these risks are, the more difficult it is to 
justify the inducement.  For every CED arrangement, there is a question of what inducement, 
burdens and risks can be levelled at patients for the sake of reducing uncertainty.  Making 
participation in the evidence development optional would avoid inducement but potentially 







Health technologies encompass a wide variety of medicines and medical services, devices, 
procedures and tests.  Governments often subsidise the cost of health technologies to make 
health care affordable and accessible for people.  Governments typically subsidise a health 
technology only when they are confident that the technology is safe, effective and cost 
effective, overall providing reasonable value for money given the broader socioeconomic 
context.  (While much of our argumentation may also apply to other payers such as private 
health insurers, we focus on governments for the sake of simplicity.  And for the sake of 
brevity, we sometimes use the word “treatment” to refer to the use of a health technology.) 
 
Technologies assessed for funding typically give rise to varying degrees of decision 
uncertainty.  The reasons for this uncertainty are numerous.  Many technologies are 
submitted for a funding decision before the evidence base is mature.  Industry may seek to 
maximise profits by gaining earlier market access, applying for government subsidy earlier in 
the development of a health technology, before all of the benefits and risks are confidently 
grasped.  Patients and the community increasingly demand earlier access to new health 
technologies that look to have promise.  Technologies are increasingly being developed for 
rare diseases, where evidence is particularly hard to develop due to low patient numbers.  
Decision uncertainty is also likely to increase with changes at the regulatory level that will 
allow more use of “real-world” evidence, which has some limitations compared to evidence 
developed experimentally [1].   
 
The government’s concern to spend funds wisely, combined with increasing uncertainty 
about the value for money on offer, has resulted in policy instruments being developed to 
reduce decision uncertainty.  There is a grey literature that details the policy instruments 
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being used [2, 3], alongside a health policy literature that studies the various policy 
instruments [4, 5, 6, 7] and provides guidance on the principles underpinning their successful 
design, implementation and evaluation [8, 9].  Coverage with evidence development (CED) is 
the most common such policy instrument, accounting for 34% of the 437 arrangements 
captured in an international review spanning from 1993 to 2016 [6].  CED is distinct in being 
the only policy instrument capable of reducing underpinning uncertainty about the safety, 
effectiveness or cost effectiveness of a technology. 
 
CED refers to when a payer funds a health technology temporarily so that evidence can be 
developed to verify claims of safety, effectiveness or cost effectiveness.  This evidence is 
either currently being developed, typically in another jurisdiction, or it must be developed by 
the party making the claims (typically the seller) in collaboration with the payer.  In 
collaborating, the payer and seller may share the costs of the evidence development.  If 
claims about the technology are not borne out, then the payer will discontinue coverage or 
renew coverage at a reduced unit price.  Conversely, if the claims are borne out, then the 
payer will introduce normal, less conditional coverage at the existing price. 
 
Garrison et al. [9] follow others [10] in distinguishing between two types of CED. 
 
1. Payers can provide coverage “only with research”, paying for the technology for all 
patients who need it while evidence to satisfactorily reduce the payer’s uncertainty is 





2. Payers can provide coverage “only in research”, paying for the technology only for 
patients who participate in the evidence development [9, p. 708]. 
 
In this article, we focus on only-in-research CED, because it raises the sharpest questions of 
coercion and inducement.  The fledgling literature that examines ethical issues rightly 
focusses on whether coercion or inducement is an inherent problem for CED [11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 16]. 
 
There is a conceptual question whether CED constitutes “research”, mere “evaluation” (or 
“audit” or “quality assurance”), or a hybrid of these.  The distinction can be drawn as follows: 
while research primarily aims to produce widely applicable knowledge, evaluation primarily 
aims to inform improvements in local service delivery or system performance.  Australia’s 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee sidesteps the conceptual question, referring to 
its CED simply in terms of “data provision arrangements” [3].  In this article, we also 
sidestep the conceptual question, writing simply of “evidence development”.  We do this 
because any answer to the conceptual question would not fundamentally change our 
argument, insofar as the ethical requirements for research and evaluation run along the same 
lines.  They are taken to do so in Australia and elsewhere [17, 18].  In general, the ethical 
requirements simply intensify as the evidence development becomes more ethically 
problematic, most obviously in terms of risks of harm. 
 
To date, Miller and Pearson have produced the most sustained ethical analysis of CED [14].  
They are right to conclude that CED arrangements merely induce rather than coerce patients 
into participating in evidence development, but not for the reasons they think.  We will 
outline our argument here then present it in detail below.  Miller and Pearson argue that 
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patients have no right to government funding for technologies that are questionably effective, 
therefore patients have no right to government funding for CED technologies, which are by 
definition questionably effective.  But it is value for money that really matters, not just 
clinical effectiveness.  This is highlighted by the fact that sometimes a technology is clearly 
effective but precisely how effective remains uncertain, so the government introduces a CED 
arrangement to better determine whether the technology is worth the costs [19].  Patients only 
have a right to government funding for technologies that a government can be confident 
provide reasonable value for money.  It is for this reason that patients have no right to CED 
technologies and therefore are not coerced.   
 
Miller and Pearson’s US context is notable for the ambivalent role that cost effectiveness and 
value for money play.  Our argument encompasses more than Miller and Pearson’s by 
including the issue of value for money.  As we argue below, Miller and Pearson are also 
insufficiently attentive to how inducement can be ethically problematic.  We argue that CED 
does pose risks to patients, and the worse these risks are, the more difficult it is to justify the 
inducement that CED typically involves, with access to the technology being conditional on 
participation in the evidence development.  We propose conditions under which the 
inducement could be ethically justified, as well as means of avoiding inducement altogether.  
These ethical issues are important to grasp because they bear on the types of CED that are 
ethically justified and, moreover, on the governance structures that ought to be in place to 
regulate and improve CED.  To develop our argument, we draw on the Australian context, so 
our conclusions apply most directly to comparable contexts, where the payer is a government 
that provides universal coverage with a regard for cost effectiveness that is prominent and 




Governments typically select for CED arrangements technologies that, among other things, 
show promise in terms of improved safety or clinical effectiveness.  The clinical use of these 
new technologies would typically be in a patient’s best interests, by which we simply mean it 
would typically be best for a patient, all things considered.  Meanwhile, only-in-research 
CED arrangements require a patient to participate in evidence development to access the 
technology.  More precisely, a patient must participate in evidence development to access 
funding for the technology.  The patient could decline to participate and pay for the 
technology themselves, but technologies are often so costly that access to them is only 
possible with government funding or some other source of support.  All of this raises two 
questions.  First, is the patient coerced or induced into participating in evidence development, 
given that typically the technology is in the patient’s best interests and cannot be accessed 
otherwise?  Second, if the patient is coerced or induced, under what circumstances, if any, is 
this ethically justified?  We tackle these two questions in order. 
 
 
Does CED coerce or induce patients to participate in evidence development? 
 
Does CED coerce or induce patients to participate in evidence development?  Miller and 
Pearson suggest that this depends on whether patients have a right to the technology [14].  If 
patients do have a right to the technology, then they are coerced into participating in evidence 
development; patients must participate to avoid the harms of missing out.  However, if 
patients do not have a right to the technology, then they are merely induced into participating; 




Miller and Pearson emphasise that coercion involves a threat of harm.  They define coercion 
by citing the Belmont Report, in which coercion occurs “when an overt threat of harm is 
intentionally presented by 1 person to another to obtain compliance” [14, p. 748].  On this 
definition, illness and its treatment may result in harms but in themselves illness and its 
treatment do not coerce since the harms are not intentionally threatened by someone to obtain 
compliance.  Miller and Pearson also cite Wertheimer, whose conception of coercion they see 
as compatible with the conception that appears in the Belmont Report.  Someone is coerced 
when there is: “(1) a threat of harm; (2) the threat violates the rights of the victim; and (3) the 
victim is made worse off than she otherwise would have been if she had not been forced to 
comply with the threat” [14, p. 748].  For the sake of argument, we do not challenge this 
conception. 
 
Miller and Pearson do not define “inducement” but they use the word in the non-pejorative 
sense of someone simply being led on or persuaded to action by something attractive [20].  
We use the word in the same sense but we are mindful of debates about whether inducement 
to participate in research constitutes undue inducement some of the time or even all of the 
time.  Undue inducement occurs when “something is being offered that is alluring to the point 
that it clouds rational judgment” [21].  Undue inducement undermines the voluntariness, and 
therefore the validity, of consent [21].  We return to questions of undue inducement below. 
 
Miller and Pearson see CED as merely inducing, not coercing: “in CED, an offer with strings 
attached, the “or else” is a legitimate condition attached to a benefit to which individuals are 
not otherwise entitled.  It is not coercive” [14, p. 748].  Miller and Pearson argue that patients 
are not coerced because patients are not entitled to unproven technologies.  They note that US 
Medicare patients have a legal right only to “reasonable and necessary” treatment [14, p. 
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748].  Miller and Pearson regard as reasonable and necessary only treatment that is good 
enough to definitively fund, not treatment that is merely good enough to fund for now under a 
CED arrangement.  In this connection, they argue that  
 
CED is no different from … phase I through phase III clinical trials.  In both cases, 
the lack of evidence sufficient to determine that a given treatment has a favorable 
risk-benefit ratio makes it appropriate to restrict covered access to research 
participation [14, p. 748]. 
 
But this reasoning is mistaken.  When a CED arrangement is introduced, “a favourable risk-
benefit ratio” is already suspected, perhaps even strongly suspected.  In other words, 
uncertainty about the new technology’s comparative safety and effectiveness is typically 
diminished enough that the technology can be regarded as probably being in the patient’s best 
interests.  This diminished equipoise actually makes the randomised controlled trial (RCT) 
highly questionable as a study design for only-in-research CED.  Arguably, an RCT is only 
justified when there is sufficient equipoise, but CED is only justified when there is 
diminished equipoise. 
 
CED is not merely research of an unproven and thereby unfunded technology.  It is more so 
the partial (conditional) coverage of a partially proven technology.  Several writers have 
made this observation when suggesting that CED arrangements may be coercive [12, 13].  
CED is more like a phase IV clinical trial, namely post-market surveillance.  Patients could 
be regarded as having a right to government funding for the technology, insofar as use of the 
technology is “necessary”, in the sense of being in their best interests, and insofar as the 
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funding is “reasonable”.  We return to funding being “reasonable” by discussing value for 
money.  Before then, let us step through Miller and Pearson’s view a little more. 
 
Let X be a health technology.  Now suppose three things.  First, without X, I will be worse 
off.  Second, I have a right to X.  Finally, to get X, I must participate in evidence 
development, which poses risks to me.  Am I coerced to participate in the evidence 
development?  To answer this question, let us return to Wertheimer’s three-part conception of 
coercion, which Miller and Pearson cite.  First, am I threatened with harm?  Yes.  The harm I 
am threatened with is my being worse off by virtue of going without X.  Second, does this 
threat violate my rights?  Yes.  I have a right not to be made worse off by virtue of going 
without X, since I have a right to X.  Finally, am I worse off for being forced to comply?  
Yes, because participation in the evidence development poses risks to me.  So supposing all 
this, I am coerced to participate in the evidence development.  But Miller and Pearson contest 
the supposition that I have a right to X.  This means that the first and second conditions of 
coercion no longer obtain, and therefore I am not coerced.  Because I have no right to X, I am 
not threatened with harm, only lured by possible benefits.  And because I have no right to X, 
my rights are not violated, even though I am made worse off by virtue of going without X.  
This is how Miller and Pearson see things. 
 
But now let us pressure Miller and Pearson’s view again.  Only-in-research CED results in 
foregone treatment for patients who refuse to participate in the evidence development.  (More 
precisely, it results in patients receiving the standard treatment rather than the new treatment.)  
If foregone treatment results merely in foregone benefits rather than in harms, then the CED 
arrangement merely induces, or tempts, namely with possible benefits; it does not coerce, 
since there is no “threat of harm” [14, p. 748].  This is how Miller and Pearson see things.  
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But the question of whether foregone treatment results merely in foregone benefits or, more 
worryingly, in harms itself hinges on whether patients have a right to the treatment.  Put 
differently, it hinges on whether the government has a duty to fund the treatment.  Our 
reasoning is as follows. 
 
Suppose that the government declines to fund a technology that a patient needs.  The patient 
cannot afford the technology and succumbs to disease.  Does the government harm the 
patient?  The answer to this question turns on whether the government has a duty to fund the 
technology or (the corollary) whether the patient has a right to access government funding for 
the technology.  If the government has no duty to fund the technology, then we would say 
that the patient is harmed by the disease, not the government.  The government, for its part, 
merely fails to benefit the patient.  However, if the government does have a duty to fund the 
technology, then we would say that the government harms the patient.  More precisely, the 
patient is harmed by the disease but also by the government in its dereliction of duty to stop 
the disease from harming the patient.  In discussing what we would or could say here, we are 
trying to trace “grammatical” relations, in Wittgenstein’s sense [22, 23, 24].  That is, we are 
trying to trace our customary ways of making sense and going on with things.  In sum, does 
the government harm me or merely fail to benefit me by declining to fund a technology 
without which I am worse off?  Things turn on the reasonable expectations or, more 
precisely, the duties that are in force [25].  Put another way, things turn on the norms that are 
alive in the context. 
 
What does this mean for CED?  Only-in-research CED results in foregone treatment for 
patients who refuse to participate in the evidence development.  Whether foregone treatment 
results merely in foregone benefits or, more worryingly, in harms depends on the duties that 
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are in force.  The idea can also be put as follows.  Suppose that standard care would improve 
my health somewhat.  The CED technology would probably improve my health even more.  
(That is partly what makes the technology a candidate for CED.)  But I am denied the CED 
technology.  So my health is improved but less than it could have been.  I am worse off than I 
could have been.  Have I been harmed?  Or have I simply been denied a benefit?  It depends 
on what I had a right to, that is, on the duties that others had to me.  It then follows that 
whether CED coerces or merely induces also depends on the duties that are in force.  We 
cannot retreat to the idea that only-in-research CED merely induces because foregone 
treatment results merely in foregone benefits rather than in harms.  Instead, we must directly 
confront the underpinning question of whether the government has a duty to fund the 
technology.  Only then can we establish whether an only-in-research CED arrangement 
coerces or merely induces. 
 
Patients do not have a right to government funding for all technologies without which they 
would be worse off, because some technologies are so costly that either the government 
cannot afford to provide them to everyone or, more commonly, the resources required could 
be better expended in other ways (for example, on other health technologies).  To reformulate 
the latter point, patients have no right to government funding for technologies that have too 
great an opportunity cost.  This norm is alive in Australia and the UK, among other countries, 
where government funds are legitimately set aside for the express purpose of availing health 
technologies to the public.  Funds are set aside with the implicit aim of maximising value for 
money across the population [26] or at least avoiding outrageous opportunity costs, which is 
to say achieving some reasonable level of value for money.  The aim of avoiding outrageous 
opportunity costs is the less demanding and suffices for our argument.  It equates to the 
government having a duty to fund only technologies that provide reasonable value for money.  
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Patients have a right to a technology only when a government can be confident that the 
technology will provide reasonable value for money, especially considering health benefits.  
We take for granted that the government’s view of what constitutes reasonable value for 
money is itself reasonable in being responsive to the duties it owes to people.  These duties 
include ensuring that basic respect and care are given to all and being responsive to the views 
of the public and patients when it comes to what is worth spending money on.  Views on 
what is worth spending money on can differ without being unreasonable, which is one 
important reason why judgements of value for money can legitimately differ across 
jurisdictions. 
 
If a government has good reason to believe that a technology provides reasonable value for 
money, then it has a duty to fund access to the technology.  But suppose the government later 
discovers that the technology actually does not provide reasonable value for money, perhaps 
because the technology turns out to be unsafe and ineffective by the light of good evidence 
collected in the interim.  Then in effect the government discovers that it now has a duty to 
remove funding from the technology, not that it never had a duty to fund the technology.  
Duties depend on epistemic conditions (what is known) at the time.  The duty to disinvest 
from technologies that fail to provide reasonable value for money is a corollary of the duty to 
fund only technologies that provide reasonable value for money. 
 
The very uncertainty that underpins CED entails that the government cannot have a duty to 
fund the CED technology.  The government has reason to believe that it will have a duty to 
fund the technology once evidence sufficiently speaks in favour of the technology, but the 
government does not have this duty yet.  If a CED arrangement is justified in terms of 
epistemic need (the need for evidence to reduce uncertainty about the technology), then the 
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government has no duty to fund the technology, since serious questions must remain about 
value for money.  All of this means that only-in-research CED involves inducement rather 
than coercion, just as Miller and Pearson argue, but for a different reason.  Contrary to what 
Miller and Pearson argue, a CED technology can be in the best interests of the patient, 
especially when the CED is undertaken to reduce uncertainty about precisely how effective is 
the technology and therefore whether it provides reasonable value for money considering its 
cost.  This sort of CED is undertaken in Australia [19], but cost features less explicitly in the 
US, where Miller and Pearson write.  Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some CED in the US 
is undertaken to reduce uncertainty that ultimately pertains to value for money, even if a term 
like “value for money” is avoided in favour of determining whether definitive funding of a 
technology would be “reasonable” [14, p. 748]. 
 
 
If the patient is coerced or induced, under what circumstances, if any, is this ethically 
justified? 
 
It is important to determine whether CED coerces or induces because coercion seems harder 
to justify ethically.  This is perhaps because coercion is less respectful of people, or less 
respectful of people in their autonomy.  But Australia also takes a dim view of inducing 
people to participate in research when participation presents possibilities of loss, especially in 
the form of discomfort or harm [27, ch. 2.1].  Australia’s national research guidelines assert 
the following: “payment that is disproportionate to the time involved, or any other 
inducement that is likely to encourage participants to take risks, is ethically unacceptable” 
[27, 2.2.10].  The underlying idea seems to be that to induce someone to take risks relating to 
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research participation is typically to manipulate them or at least to distort their assessment of 
possible gains and losses.  The concept of undue inducement is implied [21].  While there is 
considerable debate about inducement in research ethics, there is good reason to have moral 
concerns in view of the “structurally diminished voluntariness” and “routine powerlessness” 
observable among some research participants [28].  In short, inducement can be morally 
problematic, which is a point that Miller and Pearson neglect. 
 
It is important to determine the possibilities of loss faced by participants in the evidence 
development of a CED arrangement.  This is because the inducement that only-in-research 
CED involves is harder to justify as the possibilities of loss worsen.  
 
Evidence development does face participants with possibilities of loss.  It may impose 
additional burdens, such as blood tests or radiological examinations required purely for the 
purposes of evidence development and not treatment.  More commonly, participants will 
simply face possibilities of loss in terms of their privacy and the confidentiality of their data, 
given that the data collection, storage and analysis involved in evidence development may be 
more extensive (and therefore riskier, even if very slightly) than it is with treatment alone.  A 
participant also faces possibilities of loss insofar as gaining access to a beneficial technology 
only to have it withdrawn could reduce their welfare overall.  For example, suppose that a 
participant gains health benefits from a technology but these are outweighed by the physical 
side-effects of withdrawal or by the psychological impact of losing access to the technology 





On one reading, Australia’s research guidelines suggest that all inducement to participate in 
research that poses risks to participants constitutes undue inducement [27, 2.2.10].  However, 
there is debate on this issue internationally.  Some level of inducement to participate in 
evidence development could potentially be justified by the benefits of the evidence 
development, especially when the benefits stand to favour participants or disadvantaged 
groups.  But the risks to participants probably need to be minor.  To induce participants to 
take on serious risk is highly problematic ethically. 
 
In Australia, Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs) sometimes permit researchers to 
study people’s data or tissue without requiring the researchers to obtain consent from those 
people.  Committees do this when it seems justified in view of numerous considerations [27, 
ch. 2.3].  Committees consider the magnitude and probability of benefits attaching to the 
research.  Committees consider the magnitude and probability of losses faced by research 
participants, especially risks of discomfort and harm.  This includes the discomfort or harm 
that seeking consent may itself cause people.  Committees consider the feasibility (including 
the cost) of seeking consent.  Committees consider how people would be likely to react if 
they discovered that their data or tissue was studied without their consent in a specific way 
and for a specific purpose.  How people would be likely to react also gives some indication of 
the severity of infringement to people’s privacy and to the confidentiality of their data.  
Committees typically grant consent waivers for population-based studies that take care to 
link, de-identify, and then analyse data that is already routinely collected as part of clinical 
treatment, especially when the population is very large and gaining consent would be very 
burdensome, if not impossible.  The Australian public is supportive of this [29].  In such 
cases, committees judge that the risks to research participants, which primarily relate to 
privacy and confidentiality, are minor compared to the potential wider benefits of the 
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research.  This exact reasoning applies to some CED arrangements, such that the evidence 
development is justified, perhaps even in the absence of patient consent.  But this reasoning 
does not apply to other CED arrangements.  For example, the discomfort or harm of having 
blood taken from one purely for evidence development is probably greater than the 
discomfort or harm of having one’s data de-identified and analysed.  Ethical review by a 
HREC or analogous body is needed to determine whether the particulars of a CED 
arrangement justify evidence development in the absence of patient consent or, if consent is 
to be sought, the precise consent processes to be used. 
 
We argued above that the government has no duty to fund a CED technology.  But from this 
it does not follow that the government can attach whatever conditions it wishes to attach to 
funding for CED technologies.  The question becomes which conditions are ethically 
acceptable.  Perhaps the government is justified in linking and analysing the patient’s medical 
records but not in requiring additional blood tests or radiological examinations.  For every 
CED arrangement, there is a question of what burdens and risks are acceptable to attach to 
funding for the benefit of reducing uncertainty, especially remembering that patients are 
induced with possible health benefits to take on these burdens and risks.  Would it be 
ethically permissible to burden participants a lot only to reduce uncertainty a little?  Again, 
there is a need for ethical review here, by HRECs and analogous bodies.  And they should 
probably apply the principle of the least restrictive alternative, requiring that uncertainty be 
satisfactorily reduced with the least possible inducement, burden and risk.  The government 
has good reason to reduce uncertainty by a particular amount, and the ethically acceptable 




The government could avoid inducing people by designing a CED arrangement such that 
involvement in the evidence development is untethered from gaining funding for the 
technology.  Participation in the evidence development could be optional in the sense that 
declining to participate would not entail foregoing funded treatment.  The arrangement would 
then resemble only-with-research CED, with the subset of studied patients being volunteers 
[9].  Voluntary participation could also ease a potential ethical problem pertaining to only-
with-research CED.  It could eliminate the potential injustice of only a subset of patients 
bearing the burdens of evidence development when all patients benefit in the form of gaining 
funded access to the CED technology. 
 
Respect for people in their autonomy suggests that a CED arrangement should feature a 
consent process whereby it is reasonably easy for a person to act in line with their wishes.  
The precise consent process to be used should be reviewed for its ethical acceptability case 
by case.  For example, confusing and manipulative recruitment materials would undermine 
the informed and voluntary nature of participants’ consent, invalidating it. 
 
Miller and Pearson rightly observe that making participation in the evidence development 
optional could result in “delaying or even precluding development of the needed evidence” 
[14, p. 749].  It could weaken the evidence by introducing self-selection bias, for instance.  
But this problem is not specific to CED.  It would need to be carefully considered for each 
CED arrangement, just as HRECs regularly consider whether a consent waiver is justified in 
any particular research project. 
 
When the possible losses attaching to participation in the evidence development are minor, it 
may well be ethically permissible for the government to fund the CED technology only for 
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patients who agree to participate in the evidence development.  This would be a case of 
justified inducement to participate in evidence development.  However, when the possible 
losses attaching to participation in the evidence development are more than minor, the 
government probably ought to fund the technology even for patients who decline to 
participate in the evidence development.  This would be to avoid unjustified inducement.  
More importantly, these matters need to be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis under 
an appropriate governance structure, and existing HRECs and analogous bodies are well 
positioned to do this work. 
 
Do patients perhaps have a duty to participate in the evidence development?  And does any 
such duty perhaps function to reduce or justify the inducement involved?  These questions 
extend beyond the scope of this article, but they should feature in future research that expands 
the ongoing debate about whether people have a duty to participate in research [30, 31, 32, 





We have argued that patients have a right to government funding only for technologies that 
the government can be confident provide reasonable value for money.  This is at least the 
case in situations where a government has legitimately set aside funds for the express purpose 
of availing health technologies to the public and there is an accepted aim of achieving 
reasonable value for money.  Patients have no right to funding for a CED technology because 
a technology is only ever a candidate for CED by providing questionable value for money 
given what is known at the time.  For this reason, CED that results in foregone treatment for 
20 
 
patients declining to participate in the evidence development does not coerce but merely 
induces patients to participate in evidence development.  In many cases, the losses faced by 
participants will be limited to minor risks regarding privacy and confidentiality.  The benefits 
of the evidence development may well justify these and the inducement involved.  But 
inducement will rarely be justified when CED arrangements involve greater risks to 
participants.  In such cases, patients should be given the option to participate in the evidence 
development without having to forego funded treatment should they decline to participate.  
Importantly, these matters should be assessed for each CED arrangement through appropriate 
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